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Abstract 
Critiques of the dehumanising aspects of contemporary medical practice have generated increasing 
interest in the ways in which health care can foster a holistic sense of well being. We examine the 
relationship between two areas of this humanistic endeavour, narrative and dignity. This paper 
makes two simple arguments that are intuitive but have not yet been explored in detail: that 
narrative competence of carers is required for maintaining or recreating dignity, and that dignity 
promotion in health care practice is primarily narrative in form. The multiple meanings that dignity 
has in a person's life are what give the concept power and can only be captured by narrative. This 
has implications for health care practice where narrative work will be increasingly required to 
support patient dignity in under-resourced and over-subscribed health care systems. 
 
 
From the late twentieth century there have been increasing critiques of the dehumanising aspects of 
contemporary medical practice. Criticisms have focused on the displacement of the person of the 
patient by technologies, the redefinition of the patient in biomedical terms, and the distress suffered 
by patients navigating a highly impersonal, overpressured health care system (Conrad 2007, Little 
2002, Stepien and Baernstein 2006, Haslam 2007, Gordon 2005, Evans 2008). In response to this 
there has been increasing interest in the ways in which medical practice can foster, not just physical 
healing, but wellbeing. In this article we examine the relationship between two areas of this 
humanistic endeavour: narrative and dignity. That the two are closely connected is perhaps intuitive, 
even obvious; several commentators have noted them in passing (Coulehan 2007). However, these 
connections have not yet been explored in any detail. 
While there has been an enormous amount of research on patient dignity, very little has 
looked explicitly at how and where narrative competence might be utilised as a key skill in sustaining 
and promoting that of dignity. Conversely while the move towards a humanistic approach to 
medicine has been pioneered by scholars interested in literature and narrative (Charon 2006, Frank 
1995), how this impacts on and relates to the concept of dignity has never been fully explored. This 
paper makes two simple arguments whose implications are of importance for practitioners: that 
narrative is the core competency required for maintaining or recreating dignity, and that dignity 
promotion in health care practice is reliant on competent narrative communication. In this paper we 
first offer a brief exploration of the concept of dignity, then map some connections between dignity 
and narrative in illness contexts, and finally explicate the implications for health care practice. 
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The argument that dignity promotion in health care practice is usually narrative in form 
offers a modest response to the question of the real utility of the idea of dignity. This question has 
occupied much of the 1200-odd publications on dignity in recent times (Jacobson 2007), and 
continues to occupy contributors to this symposium. The word is used widely in many areas 
including human rights and bioethics: policy statements declaring the right to “a life in 
dignity”(General Comment No.14 2000) and the importance of giving care “with respect for the 
equal value of all human beings and for the dignity of the individual”(Swedish Health and Medical 
Services Act 2001) abound. But what, really, is meant by dignity? Uses of the word are so varied as to 
make a precise definition at best difficult and at worst undesirable. Dignity may be broadly defined 
as “the state of being worthy of honour or respect”(Concise Oxford Dictionary 1999), and when ‘the 
preservation of human dignity’ is enshrined in a Bill of Rights or a code of ethics, it is to safeguard 
attention to these qualities for all human beings., But why should all people be regarded as equally 
worthy of honour or respect? In these documents the word dignity tends to amount simply to an a 
priori assertion that humans have worth and/or require respectful treatment.  
Historically the rationale for the concept of dignity derived from medieval Christian 
philosophy and from the particular reformulation of these ideas by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. 
Medieval Christians ascribed dignity to ‘man’ (and not to animals) because he alone was made in 
God’s image: God’s perfection gave man his dignity. In the eighteenth century Kant offered a new 
theory of dignity that has largely defined the terms of debate ever since (Jacobson 2009). Kant 
theorised the concept of human dignity as Menschenwürde, an inalienable value (literally, ‘worth’) 
that has no equivalent, and belonging to every person by virtue of their (human) capacity for moral 
judgement. He derives this dignity as a consequence of his famed formulation of the ‘categorical 
imperative’: that in order to be able to regard one’s own existence as something that has objective 
value, all people must apply that recognition equally to others (Shell 2008). Hence the principle that 
all humans should be treated as ends in themselves and never as a means to an end.  
While Kant generated the frame for an assertion of inalienable human worth, his concept 
has since then been used in many arenas, such as the legal enshrining of rights, codes of ethics, and 
bioethical scholarship – often rather uncritically, and without attention to either the limitations of 
his theory (which appears to potentially exclude all sorts of morally incompetent people such as the 
mentally compromised or children, as discussed by others in this volume) or to its potential 
implications for various areas of use, such as healthcare. Instead, in these documents dignity is in 
practice collapsed back into being either a mere assertion of value or becomes a proxy for other 
ethical principles. At least one commentator has stated that dignity is a worthless concept, and could 
be better expressed in terms of the familiar bioethical concepts of respect and autonomy. In this 
view dignity constitutes nothing more profound than respect for an individual’s autonomy, and its 
consequences do not extend beyond those of medical ethics, namely: the need to obtain voluntary, 
informed consent; the requirement to protect confidentiality; and the need to avoid discrimination 
and abusive practices (Macklin 2003). 
Yet the word dignity remains compelling, and we, along with several other recent writers on 
dignity, argue that this is because of its capacity to address the multidimensional aspects of human 
value and self worth. Nordenfeldt, for example, very usefully identifies four ‘types’ or concepts of 
dignity as operating within Western discourse: dignity as merit, dignity as moral stature, dignity of 
identity and Menschenwürde. While the first two are dignities that derive from social circumstances, 
the third, dignity of identity, arises from our sense of ourselves as integrated and autonomous 
persons, and hence is something more complex and more profound than mere feelings of self-worth 
(Nordenfelt 2004). Whilst Nordenfeldt accepts a simple autonomy-based interpretation of Kant’s 
Menschenwürde, his formulation of ‘dignity of identity’ is indicative of the deep sense in which 
dignity is expressive of the self, something far beyond mere social ascriptions or interpretations. 
Similarly, in her excellent review of the scholarship on dignity, Jacobson proposed a classification 
termed ‘social dignity’, which in turn encompasses ‘dignity of self’ and ‘dignity in relation’, both 
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vested in the social, that is, interactive context of the individual’s life and hence expressive of a 
complex selfhood (Jacobson 2007).  
For other scholars this complexity and multidimensionality is directly entailed by Kant’s own 
formulation of the concept of Menschenwürde. Shell, for example, argues that scholars like Macklin, 
Nordenfeldt, Beyleveld and Brownsword (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001) who see 
Menschenwürde as primarily predicated on autonomy, offer only a ‘thin’ interpretation of his ethics 
of dignity, which she posits instead is vested in people’s embodied rationality, their ‘humanity’ (Shell 
2008). Other scholars have been at pains to show that Menschenwürde is indeed related to our 
individual sense of self-worth and the fundamental value self-worth has in people’s lives(Maslow 
1970; Kohlberg 1973). Edgar’s reply to Nordenfeldt, for example, suggests that Menschenwürde 
might be secured and predicated upon three profoundly human potentials (no matter to what 
degree these are realized): the potential to control one’s body, the potential to develop complex 
social competencies, and the potential for complex linguistic competencies. These are deeply moral 
in Edgar’s view, because they provide the basis through which humans are capable of conferring 
experiential, even existential, dignity on themselves and others.  
Regardless of where on hangs one’s philosophical hat, all three scholars point to the 
extensive and profound degree to which dignity is part of our embodied and relational repertoire, 
and hence, multivalent without being meaningless. It is fairly obvious that that some of the most 
important aspects of dignity are those that emerge through the subtleties of interactions between 
individuals – for example, when a loss of dignity is experienced. Dignity in this sense is a comparative 
value, but unique to the individual. It can be promoted or violated by others and affected by the 
challenges of illness and ageing. It is “equated with self-worth…To lose one’s dignity is to feel that 
one’s value as a person is irreparably diminished”(Toombs 2004, 193). Such a formulation of dignity 
gives Menschenwürde power and meaning because it highlights relational autonomy. This stresses 
that people are socially embedded and that social relations play an inextricable role in defining 
identity and conceptions of individual autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). These forms of 
dignity, and the impact of their loss on not just an individual’s feelings but on their sense of self, are 
what make the concept of dignity more than a simple notion of autonomy or even respect (however 
dominant these features remain), and why it matters particularly in health care.  
In fact, we suggest that dignity’s multivalent and often imprecise use, which is so 
problematic for principlist bioethical analysis, is partly what makes it a useful word in health care. It 
has rich literary and aesthetic qualities, which have slowly accumulated and shaped it from as far 
back as Aristotle(Gallagher et al. 2008). Centuries of discourse have imbued the word with layers of 
meaning. Dignity emerges “at the interface of the moral and the aesthetic”(Pullman 2002, 77); our 
culturally derived notion of what constitutes a beautiful life, for example, informs our views of the 
characteristics of dignity. The connection between what is uniquely personal, highly nuanced and 
complex, and what is more generalisable (such as ideas about worth, autonomy or respect) in many 
uses of the term, and in the useful definitions offered by Nordenfelt and others, is precisely the sort 
of connection that is given value in analyses of the ethical qualities of literature (Nussbaum 1990). 
Nussbaum and others have argued that literature holds a unique and valuable place in ethics 
because its very subtleties are what provide us with the capacity for cultivating our moral 
imaginations and for developing a fine-grained appreciation for moral action and moral capacities in 
ourselves and others (Nussbaum 1990).  
We further suggest that if our view of dignity as primarily embodied, relational and vested in 
identity is correct, then it follows that dignity will often be enacted through narrative, and will 
mostly become meaningful in a narrative context. This may be especially the case in health care. The 
narratives relayed by patients to their carers, and the narratives reflected back to them by doctors 
and nurses, constitute the opportunity for the demonstration of the sometimes fleeting and subtle 
forms of attending, validating, caring and responding that constitute relating. This ‘microethics’ may 
be dignity-enhancing depending on the skills of and constraints on each party (as is well understood 
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within feminist ethics (Jaggar 1998; Nussbaum and Sen 1989)). We will explore these issues by 
further examining the inherently narrative qualities of social dignity and dignity of identity. 
Narrative is basic to our sense of self. We live and create meaning through temporal, 
contingent stories: “[s]tories link past, present, and future in a way that tells us where we have 
been, where we are, and where we could be going. . . [They] turn mere chronology, one thing after 
another, into the purposeful action of plot, and thereby into meaning”(Taylor 2001, 2). All stories 
have a point, a message that they convey, and usually not a simple message either. By selecting 
events, characters and actions and showing the relations between them, stories build coherence and 
generate meaning. When communicated (and their purpose is to communicate, including to their 
author(s)), narratives bring author and audience, speaker and listener, into relation with one 
another, generating intersubjectivity, a shared understanding. This process is imbued with ethical 
responsibility: “[t]he telling of narratives itself becomes a moral action that has the potential to 
shape the lives of both the teller and the listener, leading to a form of culture-wide knowledge that 
ultimately determines how human beings rediscover and recreate their individual selves”(Charon 
2001, 63).  
It is unsurprising then that narrative features figure prominently in the discourse 
surrounding dignity, for example in Jacobson’s analysis of the features of dignity interactions 
(Jacobson 2009). Jacobson argues that four broad elements of an interaction define the degree to 
which dignity will be preserved, enhanced or violated during its course. The four elements are: the 
position of each actor; the characteristics of the relationship between the actors; the setting; and 
the features of the wider social order in which the encounter is situated (Jacobson 2009). These 
create a story which can bolster or disrupt a sense of dignity. It is striking that these echo the plot, 
form, time and frame of narratives that are found in literature and in life. Dignity is thereby 
recognised as being dependent on and even as representing the integrity of the personal narrative 
itself, as Pullman comments: “[m]aintaining a unified and meaningful life narrative is both a moral 
and an aesthetic project .... Suffering occurs when any aspect of the person is threatened or is 
perceived as undergoing disintegration. Such aesthetic upheaval is often referred to as a loss of 
dignity”(Pullman 2002, 84).  
The absence of narrative work on the part of carers is glaringly apparent in circumstances of 
dignity violation. Features of dignity-violating encounters include actors paired in positions of 
vulnerability and antipathy, asymmetry in perceived power or status of the actors, and harsh 
circumstances (Jacobson 2009). Social processes identified in these encounters include indifference, 
condescension, contempt, objectification and exploitation. In health care settings the disruption of a 
coherent self narrative by illness weakens the position of the patient such that he or she is 
particularly vulnerable to the effect of hostile circumstances, which over time may register as 
sequential losses, leading to victimisation, social isolation, reduced help-seeking behaviours and 
chronic poor health (Jacobson 2009). Whilst many aspects of dignity violation may be hard to avoid 
(simply because of the degree to which dignity of identity arises from the integrity of the body, now 
threatened by illness) and have doubtless occurred in virtually all times and varieties of health care 
system, it is also not difficult to argue that the strain provided on western health care systems at 
present are such as to provide particular threats to patient dignity. The severity of under-resourcing 
has, for example, resulted in long wait times and underattendance on patient needs (for example, 
one the production of incontinence in the elderly as a result of inability to access facilities in a timely 
fashion (Lekan-Rutledge and Colling 2003, Zhang and Grabowski 2004). Health care workers 
frequently express frustration at their inability to spend the time patients need to discuss 
information and options while navigating increasingly complex complaints and highly technological 
interventions into them.  
Perhaps most profound though least obvious or measurable are the losses to the sense of 
self attendant upon highly bureaucratic management systems, in which the criteria applied for 
‘quality audits’ etc may conceptually erase the existential aspects of illness and healing, putting 
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them beyond articulation for patients and their carers alike (Evans 2008). In fact, the very nature of 
medical narratives may at times threaten dignity and patients may need to reclaim dignity by 
directly countering or resisting these narratives. Medicine is effective because scientific 
methodologies have made it possible to extract the common features of illness and to address these 
features through therapies with relatively uniform efficacy. However this approach may be in 
tension with other aspects of well being for the patient, because it can “suppress subjectivity and 
the uniqueness of experience, dominating and objectifying the person who is the patient. The 
danger is that these metanarratives can be internalised as valid descriptions of self and 
experience”(Sakalys 2003, 230). As is well known in the history of medicine, this is particularly 
problematic when a diagnosis either erases some aspect of patient experience or translates parts of 
identity and experience into wholly pathological terms – think of body weight/obesity, depressive 
illness, or ‘lengthy’ labour. The inability to reflect on and perhaps deviate from an established 
medicalised ‘route’ of diagnoses and interventions may, in the end, be experienced as profoundly 
undignified by both patients and doctors alike, as is frequently the case with the use of high-
intervention intensive-care technologies and practices in terminal situations (Basta and Tauth 1996)  
When we view dignity from a narrative perspective we can understand the threat that illness 
poses to dignity as a result of narrative disruption. The diagnosis of disease and the physical 
experience of ill health upset a conventional conception of time and the trajectory and contingency 
of a person’s life. As narrative analyst Arthur Frank comments,  
“the central resource that any storyteller depends on [is] a sense of 
temporality. The conventional expectation of any narrative...is for a past that 
leads into a present that sets in place a foreseeable future. The illness story is 
wrecked because its present is not what the past was supposed to lead up to, 
and the future is scarcely thinkable”(Frank 1995, 55).  
A loss of congruency between mind and body through the experience of an unpredictable and 
independent body is an enormous betrayal (Pullman 2002). This threatening existential aspect of 
illness, so undercutting to a sense of self and dignity of identity, was articulated by sociologist 
Barbara Rosenblum:  
“You don’t know from moment to moment whether to call a particular 
sensation a ‘symptom’ or a ‘side effect’ or a ‘sign’…Words and their referents 
are uncoupled, uncongealed, no longer connected. You live in a mental world 
where all the information you have is locked into the present moment…I’m 
hostage to the capriciousness of my body, a body that sabotages my sense of a 
continuous and taken-for-granted reality”(cited in Rimmon-Kenan 2006, 242). 
Rosenblum felt she had lost the central narrative features of a sense of temporal continuity and 
causality. Her orderly description of disintegration offered a means of overcoming helplessness and 
lack of control, and, in restoring herself to herself constituted a reclamation of dignity.  
The implications of such tales of reclamation are simple: narrative competence on the part 
of both patient and carers – which is to say, the ability to develop complex narratives, to analyse 
texts, recognise patterns within them, and through them to develop capacities for self reflection and 
empathy – provides the means to promote and sustain dignity for both parties through recognition, 
integration and reformulation of an authentic self narrative. Central to narrative therapy is the idea 
that “the narrating of the patient’s story is a therapeutically central act, because to find the words to 
contain the disorder and its attendant worries gives shape to and control over the chaos of 
illness”(Charon 2001, 1898). The importance of patients’ illness narratives for their healing is, of 
course, well established (Frank 1995; Charon 2004). By ‘healing’ we intend to convey a shift towards 
‘well being’, something more than mere reductions in the pathologies of the body. Illness narratives 
enable this shift both by giving expression to suffering and by developing a new coherence in the self 
that suffers. These narratives have two sides: “One side … expresses the threat of disintegration 
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presented by illness ... while the other side seeks a new integration of body-self”(Frank 1995, 171). 
We suggest that the most dignity-promoting of the three types of illness narratives distinguished by 
Arthur Frank (Frank 1995) is the more complicated ‘quest’ narrative, in which coherence, meaning 
and purpose are major features, along with a need to communicate one’s narrative to others and 
hence to cast it in a more relational form. Dignity is sustained throughout the quest narrative 
because of the developing moral capacities of its author as he or she encounters and moves through 
difficulties. The narrative functions so as to draw attention to this moral development in ways that 
parallel its function in literary settings (Nussbaum 1990). 
Because of its unique capacity to return the ability to attribute meaning to the patient’s 
experiences and sense of self, narrative medicine (something deliberately practiced by carers) is 
intrinsically dignity promoting. Narrative ethics requires that stories are fully told and heard, that all 
sides and voices are honoured and that all suffering is acknowledged (Charon 2008). Narrative 
medicine simply translates these principles into health care settings and insists on their priority as a 
part of health care. A leading exponent of narrative medicine, Rita Charon, writes that narrative 
practice is powerful because: 
“not only is diagnosis encoded in the narratives patients tell of symptoms, but 
deep and therapeutically consequential understandings of the persons who 
bear symptoms are made possible in the course of hearing the narratives told 
of illness. Along with scientific ability, physicians need the ability to listen to 
the narratives of the patient, grasp and honor their meanings, and be moved 
to act on the patient’s behalf”(Charon 2004, 1897). 
Current dignity-oriented care programs primarily use narrative techniques, though they are not 
always labeled as such. Most famously, Harvey Chochinov’s dignity therapy in palliative care focuses 
on generativity, continuity of self, role preservation, and maintenance of pride – all narrative themes 
(Chochinov et al. 2005). The central element in dignity therapy in palliative care is legacy work, that 
is, therapy sessions that explore and unify past events to reflect a legacy that is meaningful to the 
patient. This active work on the life narrative is rightly seen as the critical component of supporting 
the person's dignity. It is unfortunate that it is only at the end of life that this investment in the 
patient’s dignity is positioned as a priority. 
It would be impractical and unnecessary to do extensive dignity work with every patient. 
Furthermore, we do not believe that ‘narrative medicine’ always, often or necessarily involves much 
investment of time – something we have already identified as lacking in under-resourced health care 
environments. It is often fairly brief validating interactions – physical expressions of support, 
humorous interchanges, the pose of ‘active listening’ – that can be restorative or sustaining of 
dignity of identity that is threatened by illness and the experience of institutional health care. In our 
view, following Charon, these are part of the cultivation of narrative competence. They take 
advantage of the forms of knowledge and opportunities for relating that are open to patients and 
their carers within the constraints of their circumstances. For example, brief interventions are 
naturally built into the history that is taken with narrative competence. Some aspects of life 
narrative interviewing could be a core part of routine patient care where distress is identified, 
regardless of cause. “During times of stress, individuals need to reminisce and recall positive aspects 
of their lives, especially their strengths and resources…What is essential is recognition of 
opportunities and conscious intent to listen”(Sakalys 2003, 235). Carel reiterates the value of 
integrating narrative awareness into daily practice and highlights how dignity work need not be 
separate from medical care:  
“A phenomenological approach would clarify to the health professional what 
the impact of illness is on the ill person’s life and it would address the 
asymmetry of the encounter. Addressing this aspect of the patient-clinical 
relationship may be beneficial to other issues, such as compliance...This 
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approach could also enhance interviewing techniques and ways of listening 
that could, in turn, lessen the danger of misdiagnosis. And finally, the patient 
experience...may be radically changed if they feel that their loss and the ways 
in which their world has become limited have been acknowledged”(Carel 2008, 
45).  
This approach has the additional and not unimportant merit of promoting the dignity of the 
practitioner at the same time, since this is affected by how they treat and respond to patients in 
what can be redesigned as a self reinforcing positive cycle: “[o]ur sense of personal dignity is 
wrapped up in the lives of others, how we respond to the pain and suffering of one another will 
either enhance or undermine that dignity”(Pullman 2002, 85). 
Narrative medicine is an ethical practice, and we feel it is appropriate to continue to place 
the maintenance of and respect for patient dignity at its heart. The concept of dignity provides a 
strong foundation for the very challenging work of maintaining a sense of self win the face of the 
disintegrating forces of illness and the alienating aspects of late-industrial health care systems. As 
Christina Middlebrook wrote of her illness, what was important was the way hospital staff “came 
regularly to the bedside and, unwittingly, held my identity for me when I dared not”(cited in Charon 
2006, 97). The idea of dignity has been much called upon in moves to bring the notion of the patient 
as a distinct self back into the centre of medical practice. This self is necessarily narrative in its 
expression, so that to speak of bringing the patient's self-hood, and dignity, back into the discourse 
is to speak of bringing their personal story to the fore. Thus the link between dignity and narrative is 
fundamental to the creation and sustenance of humanistic practice in medicine. 
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